W IKE other OECD countries, New Zealand has an ageing population, with serious consequences for the future financing of retirement incomes. Unlike -A^-Jother OECD countries, however, New Zealand has chosen not to make saving for retirement compulsory, not to fund it through earmarked taxes, and not to encourage it with tax incentives. Are diese choices wise?
designed to make the entire tax system more efficient by broadening tax bases and lowering tax rates (New Zealand Government, 1988) . Income tax is levied compre hensively on the income from which savings are made and on die earnings of those savings, but withdrawals of savings are tax-exempt. By contrast, Australia taxes su perannuation at every stage of the saving process, but at reduced rates.
Neutral tax treatment of all forms of savings has been difficult to achieve in practice, for mainly administrative reasons (Periodic Report Group, 1997:60-4) . Nevertheless, New Zealand has one of the world's least distorting and simplest tax systems.
Demographic Change
While the total New Zealand population is not forecast to grow appreciably by the mid-21st century, the average age is likely to increase rapidly.
Other developed countries commonly show earlier and more marked ageing of their populations than New Zealand (Table 1) . New Zealand is in a slightly better position than even Australia, which also compares favourably with OECD trends. 
NZS Expenditure Projections
Based on projections by the New Zealand Treasury (Periodic Report Group, 1997) , in die absence of any policy change NZS will more than double its share of GDP over die next 50 years from 5 per cent to 11 per cent (or from 4 per cent to 9 per cent in net terms). Many OECD countries already spend nearly 10 per cent of GDP on their public pensions; in Japan, Germany, France and Italy, government pension expenditures are projected to rise to between 14 per cent and 20 per cent of GDP in the first few decades of the 21st century (OECD, 1997:38-40) . New Zealand is thus relatively well placed in terms of projected expenditure on public pensions. Australia is in an even stronger position, with expenditure on public pen sions expected to be only about half of that for New Zealand over the period to 2050 (OECD, 1997:38-9) . However, NZS accounts for less than half of the in crease in projected ageing-related government expenditure, which also includes general health expenditure, aged and long-term care and disability services (Periodic Report Group, 1997a 
Financing Future NZS Costs
If current arrangements remain unchanged, the tax burden imposed by expenditure on NZS could constrain the growth of the economy. The options for reducing fu ture expenditure on NZS comprise raising the age of eligibility for NZS beyond age 65; changing the indexation formula for NZS; and converting NZS from a universal to a targeted benefit.
The Periodic Report Group's (1997) modelling indicated that raising the age of eligibility and targeting the benefit would allow for a fiscally sound response to the economic changes that will occur over the coming 50 years, without compromising the assurance of an adequate retirement income for all New Zealanders. It also concluded that, if the voluntary regime delivered adequate retirement incomes for die population at reasonable fiscal cost, dien compulsion should be rejected, since die benefits of compulsion in terms of redrement income or national savings out comes would not outweigh the costs of a compulsory regime (diis is discussed in detail below).
In contrast, Australia undertook no modelling before introducing compulsory superannuation. Yet the OECD (1997:38-9) projects Australia's share of GDP on expenditure on age pensions to be about half that for New Zealand.
Compulsion versus Voluntary Provision
In September 1997, New Zealanders vodng in a referendum rejected overwhelm- ingly a proposed compulsory and fully-funded private Retirement Saving Scheme (RSS). As well as doubts about the need to add the scheme to the existing savings mechanisms, a multitude of other reasons played a part in its rejection.2 The main issues raised by compulsion are summarised below.
Should governments decide how and when people save? By design, compulsory schemes restructure the choices made by individuals to ensure that they save more for retirement in a particular form than otherwise would be the case. But is it rea sonable to assume that governments know better than their citizens about desirable living standards in retirement?
The view that private choices about saving will be inferior to government in duced choices is not widely accepted in New Zealand. Jenny Shipley, then Minister for Social Welfare, now Prime Minister, stated on Sky News on 17 August 1997: 'it is not the role of the Crown to tell people how to manage their net worth. ... New Zealanders are quite able, given the choice, to make decisions about what to do with the money that will fund them in retirement without laws or compulsion or limited frames of investment'.
Is compulsion necessary to prevent myopia and free riding? The main economic arguments cited to justify compulsion are that people are either myopic or will choose to 'free ride' on the state. These arguments were probably in die mind of John Dawkins, Australia's Treasurer when compulsion was introduced diere, when he said: '... like most odier people, Australians generally undervalue savings for their own future retirement. Private voluntary savings cannot be relied upon to pro vide adequate retirement security for most Australians' (Dawkins (1992:1) .
In New Zealand, it is generally held diat myopia, to the extent that it exists, is best addressed by attacking die problem direedy dirough information and educa tion.
As for 'free riding', it is helpful to divide die populadon into diree broad groups:
1. diose who have limited capacity to save and will be reliant on public provision in retirement;
2. diose who could save, but choose instead to rely on NZS in retirement (the 'free riders'); and 3. diose who save privately, even widi NZS. Voluntary provision does not adequately deal with the second 'could save but don't' group. But how big is this group compared with the odier two? Research undertaken in New Zealand for die proposed RSS indicated that, even with a ma ture compulsory saving scheme which required that annuities be taken at retirement age, around 40 per cent of RSS income would continue to be funded by the gov ernment (New Zealand Government, 1997:64) , which suggests that the first group is relatively large.
An element of free riding will doubdess remain, irrespective of how wellinformed people are about their retirement income needs. However, the alterna tives to voluntary provision impose significant costs themselves, and these have to be weighed against the shortcomings of a voluntary regime.
The welfare costs o f compulsion. In contrast to voluntary arrangements, which may miss one of the three target groups identified above, compulsory regimes affect all three groups when they are aiming to modify the behaviour of only the 'could save but don't' group. Because this group cannot be readily identified in practice, com pulsory regimes generally force everyone to save in a particular way and at a par ticular time. This imposes large welfare costs on the entire community, through distortions to individual preferences and forgone opportunities.
In Australia, the most comprehensive published estimates of the gains in re tirement incomes from the compulsory Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC) (Willis, 1995:10-14) take no account of welfare costs. These costs arise from the forgone opportunities to choose between consumption and saving during one's working life. Even if compulsion increases retirement income, it may reduce life time welfare by limiting die uses to which current income can be put. 3
The patterns of saving are likely to vary a great deal between individuals, re flecting their different circumstances. The 'one size fits all' requirement of a com pulsory arrangement cannot cope widi diis diversity. New Zealanders tend to save more as their incomes grow and as diey get older, and many people prefer to accu mulate assets (in particular, to buy a house), radier than rely on financial assets when they save (Periodic Report Group, 1997:159-66) .
Much of the Australian literature on retirement saving reflects die trade-off be tween the flexibility of a voluntary regime and die constraints of a compulsory one. Advocates of reforms directed at tightening the rules often also call for more flexi ble arrangements for some parts of the community. For example, Mack (1996) supports die restriction of lump sums and an acceleration in the increase in the preservation age to 60 so diat 'retirement savings are used for retirement purposes only ' (1996:80) , but at die same time she criticises die system for 'fail(ing) to address the odier savings needs of individuals ' (1996:77) . Similarly, while supporting com pulsion, Davidson and McClelland (1996: 90) suggest diat people should be able to reallocate their compulsory saving to odier life-cycle purposes. Implicit in diese calls for access to superannuation prior to retirement is the view that the welfare 3See Freebaim (1996:49).
losses from forced retirement saving are not matched by the welfare gains from those savings in retirement. Sinha and Sinha (1994:27) estimate that compulsory levy rates of 9 per cent to 12 per cent impose deadweight losses of between $200 and $400 per worker per year. In aggregate, they estimate that the SGC imposes a welfare cost of $0.9 -$1.9 billion per year (or some 10-20 per cent of the cost of the age pension).
The impact o f compulsion on the financial sector. In New Zealand, it is argued that a voluntary framework for private savings is more conducive to growth than com pulsion because:
• when industry participants are competing equally for the saver's dollar, and where there is no assurance of a constant flow of 'contributions', those partici pants are likely to provide the best allocation of resources, in order to offer the best returns;
• compulsory schemes alter behaviour (and hence resource flows) throughout the economy, even though their real 'target' is only one group. So compulsion is likely to reduce the efficiency of investment in aggregate. There was a particular concern in New Zealand that if compulsion resulted in more savings being di rected to managed funds, it would starve the small business sector of self generated finance;4 and
• compulsory regimes generally apply to the rate at which people save from cur rent income, and ignore the returns to household wealth that can be gained from more efficient investment. It is possible that the return on investment could be lifted while the rate of saving remained unchanged, so increasing the benefits from that saving.
Administration and compliance costs. Compulsory private provision entails general administration and regulatory costs that a voluntary system would avoid. Such costs can be very large. Compulsory regimes also impose high compliance costs. They generally involve a plethora of reporting mechanisms that require savers, employers and the industry to generate sometimes very detailed information and to provide it on a regular basis to a number of agencies. Where compulsory arrangements are linked to tax bases, they can be very costly in terms of revenue forgone. This has been the case in Aus tralia, where the SGC 'tax' has created an added incentive to escape the income-tax net When saving is not entirely voluntary, particular groups are likely to resist modi4One answer to this problem is to exclude sell-employed people from the compulsory arrangements, as in Australia. In the proposal put to the referendum in New Zealand on the RSS, the self-employed were included on equity grounds: it did not seem just to force only part o f the community to save.
lying their behaviour in the required way, thus making such schemes vulnerable to pressures for change. For example, Duval (1996:54-7) has said of Australia's super annuation system that ... there is general agreement that the system is too complex ... and changes too frequent ... Everyone says that we need a system which is simple and stable ... but all the pressure is for change, and most of that change would make the system more complex. ... There are around 50 to 60 public ser vants in Canberra ... whose only job is to change the rules for superannua tion. These people are not idle -on the contrary they are all working very hard.
By contrast, New Zealand has had a much more settled and stable regime over the last ten years at least. This allows people to make their retirement income ar rangements confident that the rules will not be frequently changed.
The inflexibility o f compulsory regimes.
It is difficult to design a system today that will be appropriate in 40 or 50 years' time. A voluntary regime, with its relative freedom from rules and regulations, leaves people free to use their ingenuity in solving unforeseen future problems. Political processes characteristically lag behind rather than lead pressures for change, so that changes to regulations often come too late.
Compulsion and fiscal savings. However, even if people do save enough voluntar ily, they may do so in ways that elude means tests, and so do not reduce the future fiscal costs of public pensions.
This issue is not easily resolved. As income and assets tests become more so phisticated, so too do the techniques used to get round them. Compulsion may seem to provide an easy answer to this problem. As was proposed with the RSS, it could be mandatory to preserve savings to the age of eligibility for the public pen sion. But just as people lobby for special concessions in means tests, they will lobby for early access to their funds. As well, serious technical difficulties emerged as the notion of such a large pool of mandatory annuities was investigated in a small coun try like New Zealand.
Compulsion and national savings. On the other hand, the aggregate level of savings could be lower under a voluntary regime than under a compulsory one.
Certainly, the SGC is likely to increase national saving in Australia. It has gen erally been assumed that around 50 per cent of the saving undertaken as a result of the SGC is additional retirement savings resulting from compulsion, but with varia tions of between 33 per cent and 60 per cent.5 But whereas the increase in the amount of savings can be estimated, the efficiency of such saving cannot. Granting one sector of die financial market an effective guaranteed market could impose considerable efficiency losses, as would government direction of superannuation funds (though calls for this have so far been resisted in Australia). The contingent liability that a compulsory scheme imposes on a government must also be taken into account. So it remains uncertain whedier the SCG will provide a net benefit to die community.
The quality of investment is likely to be more important to a country's future capacity to cope widi an ageing population dian die amount diat citizens save. The contrast between the present economic situations of Japan (historically a high-saving nation) and die US (low historical savings measured on a traditional basis, despite generous tax incentives) can be at least pardy explained by die quality of die result ing investments.
The most direct way diat governments can contribute to national savings is by making additional savings itself. Compulsion and tax incentives lead to some de gree of substitution, and can detract from national savings in die short term. This would have happened in New Zealand under die RSS, since die fiscal costs would have been higher under die compulsory regime dian under die voluntary regime until around 2017 (New Zealand Government, 1997:14) .
Tax Incentives under a Voluntary Savings Regime
A unique feature of the New Zealand retirement income system is diat it does not offer tax incentives to encourage retirement income provision.
Tax concessions were rejected largely because it was judged highly unlikely diat they would reduce fiscal costs. Revenue impacts for even die most well designed tax incentives were shown to produce a net loss to national savings (Task Force on Private Provision for Retirement, 1992a:93-4) . Such findings are consistent widi an OECD report on taxadon and household saving, which concluded diat die net ef fect on total national saving may be negative in so far as the tax revenue lost is greater dian the additional household saving (reported in Commonwealdi Treasury, 1995:57) . Similarly, die World Bank (1994:201) stated 'it is not clear whedier tax incentives have increased aggregate saving, and most of the tax benefits have gone to high-income households, many of which would have saved in any event'.
In considering how to increase savings rates in the US, Kodikoff (1990:245) found that useful measures included: providing information to all employees about their current retirement benefits and die additional savings required to reach an adequate retirement income savings level; adopting a value added tax; and tight ening fiscal policy. This is consistent widi the New Zealand policy framework. He concluded diat tax concessions 'have critical shortcomings that are as likely as not to exacerbate our national savings problems'.
Tax concessions have been rejected in New Zealand also because, as die World Bank (1994:201) observes, diey are typically regressive: since higher-income earners have die highest capacity to save, diey generally do best out of concessions for sav ing.
It is very difficult to design tax concessions that target saving at the margin. W here concessions relate to all savings, much of their cost is wasted in subsidising behaviour that would have occurred anyway. Tax incentives cannot be designed to target only that group that can save but don't. Designing tax concessions generally means favouring some forms of saving at the expense of others. This has economic costs. Neutral taxation treatment is important if die voluntary savings market is to be truly competitive. One commentator has noted diat much of the material used to inform potential savers on die best options for retirement saving in Australia fo cuses almost solely on tax at die expense of issues such as investment quality, diver sification between and widiin markets, flexibility and die odier important factors diat should be taken into account in determining an appropriate retirement savings plan.6
Tax incentives commonly impose high compliance and administration costs. New Zealand's tax-neutral retirement schemes are administered by die Government Actuary' under die Superannuation Schemes Act 1989, which contains a mere 20 pages (litdewood, 1997:119) .
New Zealand's tax treatment is straightforward and has changed very litde over more dian a decade. This relative simplicity and stability in die system arguably creates a greater incentive to save dian complex subsidies involving constant change and uncertainty.
What Has Happened to Savings in New Zealand?
No clear-cut answer can be given to die question of what has happened to savings in New Zealand under its present retirement income policies. There are severe data problems.7 The full impact of many policies will involve time lags diat are often the subject of debate, and distinguishing die impact of retirement income policy on savings from other factors is very difficult.
The assets and liabilities held by households are accounted for mainly by housing. More dian 80 per cent of people over die age of 65 own dieir own home in New Zealand. The percentage of financial assets held by asset type has remained relatively stable since die early 1990s, widi around 70 per cent in housing, 13 per cent in banks and non-bank financial institutions, 7 per cent in superannuation funds, and die remainder shared between life insurance, private shareholdings, unit trusts and odier financial investments. Unfortunately, diis information fails to cover many asset types. It is diought diat far more household net wordi is held in assets such as rental and commercial property, capital equipment and equity in businesses than in financial products traditionally associated widi saving. With die exception of housing, very litde information is available about how much households have in vested in diese assets, aldiough saving in die form of business equity is likely to be very significant in New Zealand.
Unofficial estimates suggest New Zealand's household net wordi may not be°P markedly different from that of at least some of the major OECD countries (see Figure 1 ). Statistics New Zealand's measure of household saving is low at roughly between NZ$1,000 and NZ$3,000 per household per year over die last decade. In gross terms, business sector saving is around 12 per cent of GDP (or just under 4 per cent after allowing for depreciation). The government has substantially increased its sav ing efforts in recent years, and has run budget surpluses since 1993-94. National saving in New Zealand has risen to a level comparable to diat of odier OECD coun tries, and higher than Australia's since 1993 (Figure 2 ).
Lessons for Australia
Perhaps die biggest difference between the retirement income arrangements in New Zealand and Australia lies in the complexity of die latter. In Australia it has become conventional wisdom diat redrement income policy cannot be simple: every at tempt to simplify it appears to add yet more rules and reguladons. Australia is not alone in diis respect. For example, in the US a new company specialising in audit ing die calculation of beneficiary's entidements claims to find mistakes in half of the cases it invesdgates (Litdewood, 1997:119 ). Yet New Zealand shows that diere is a simple altemadve. Without tax incentives or compulsion, die rules can be kept to a minimum, die saving environment is much more certain and stable, and individual savers have flexibility and choice. If Australia nevertheless persists with compulsion, it is essential that reforms are undertaken to make it a truly effective mechanism to reduce fiscal costs. Such re forms include bringing the self-employed into the compulsory regime, synchronis ing the age of eligibility for the old-age pension with the vesting age, and requiring that all benefits that emerge from die compulsory scheme take the form of lifetime annuities. In addition, Australia could follow New Zealand in abolishing tax con cessions for superannuation. This would immediately sweep away much of the sys tem's complexity. In any case, there is no sound rationale for allowing concessions on compulsory saving.
In New Zealand, it remains to reform NZS. Without any targeting mechanism, NZS may become so costly as to limit future growth prospects. In this respect, New Zealand can learn from Australia, where the assets and income tests are now well established. A targeting mechanism would make the system more complicated, but this seems a small price to pay for keeping the rest of the retirement income frame work as simple and as efficient as New Zealand's is. That said, means testing does impose a disincentive to save that can be particularly damaging under a voluntary saving regime. Other changes, such as increasing the age of eligibility or altering indexation arrangements, could also be considered to minimise such impacts.
